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Abstract
OBJECTIVE
In this paper we investigate the effectiveness of family policies in the context of the social
structure of a population.
METHODS
We use an agent-based model to analyse the impact of policies on individual fertility de-
cisions and on fertility at the aggregate level. The crucial features of our model are the
interactions between family policies and social structure, the agents’ heterogeneity, and
the structure and influence of the social network. This modelling framework allows us
to disentangle the direct effect (the alleviation of resource constraints) from the indirect
effect (the diffusion of fertility intentions via social ties) of family policies.
RESULTS
Our results indicate that family policies have a positive and significant impact on fertility.
In addition, the specific characteristics of the social network and social effects do not only
relate to fertility, but also influence the effectiveness of family policies.
CONCLUSIONS
Family policies can only be successful if they are designed to take into account the char-
acteristics of the society in which they are implemented.
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1. Introduction
Many countries of the Western world have witnessed below-replacement fertility, with
fertility rates falling to ever lower levels during the 1980s and 1990s. Despite the slight
increases observed in several countries (Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari 2009; Goldstein,
Sobotka, and Jasilioniene 2009), the continuation of current fertility trends may lead to
population ageing and shrinkage over the long run. Governments are increasingly in-
terested in developing family policies that address the possible causes of these trends.
Currently, however, there is no broad consensus on the effectiveness of policies intended
to achieve a sustainable increase in — or at least stabilisation of — fertility.
Having assessed data from 22 industrialised countries over the period 1970–1990,
Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) found that cash benefits in the form of family allowances are
positively related to fertility. McDonald (2006), on the other hand, has argued that prona-
talist policies are both expensive and ineffective. After examining Swedish data, Björk-
lund (2006) found that the extension of family policies from the mid-1960s to around
1980 raised the level of fertility. Using data from high-income countries in Europe and
North America, Feyrer, Sacerdote, and Stern (2008) found that a doubling of spending per
child is associated with an increase in fertility of 0.15 children. Gauthier (2007), trying to
generalise empirical findings in a comprehensive survey, noted that studies using micro-
level data often show that parental and maternity leave schemes have positive effects on
completed cohort fertility, while studies using macro-level data typically find that family
policies influence the timing of births, rather than the total number of children. However,
she inferred that the impact of these schemes tends to be small, and varies depending on
the data used and on the type of policies.
Many empirical studies on the effectiveness of family policies suffer from a static con-
cept of cause and effect that disregards the peer group effects of family policies exerted via
social learning and social influence mechanisms. Moreover, studies comparing the impact
of family policies in different countries often ignore differences in the societal structures
in the countries under consideration. This is surprising given that the literature on fertility
has identified social networks as a key mechanism in explaining fertility intentions (for a
comprehensive literature survey, see Balbo, Billari, and Mills 2013, p.15). Kohler, Billari,
and Ortega (2002) identified economic and social changes, social interaction processes,
institutional changes, and postponement-quantum interactions as the main causes of low
fertility in Europe. Social interactions, such as personal communication about fertility
intentions or perceived social norms and social pressure, may influence childbearing de-
cisions (Bernardi 2003; Fernandez and Fogli 2006). Moreover, social networks may not
only influence individual childbearing preferences, but also the individual feasibility of re-
alising these preferences based on the availability of resources such as informal childcare,
emotional assistance, and material support (Bühler and Philipov 2005; Philipov, Spéder,
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and Billari 2006; Balbo and Mills 2011). However, Montgomery and Casterline (1996)
claimed that several empirical studies assessing social effects on fertility apply designs
that are not capable of accounting for endogenous social network formation.
Our main hypothesis is that social structure, social learning, and social influence
mechanisms influence the effectiveness of family policies. Montgomery and Casterline
(1996) distinguish between social learning, which means referring to the knowledge and
information of others; and social influence, which is based on the desire to avoid con-
flict within social groups and the threat of group disintegration. They argue that social
networks (i) provide information that expands the set of choices, (ii) demonstrate the con-
sequences of behaviour adopted within the group, and (iii) affect individual preferences
through social influence effects and conformity pressures. Thus, one individual adopting
a certain behaviour may induce a snowball process, with the behaviour spreading from
person to person. We build upon this idea, assuming that fertility preferences, and par-
ticularly the change in fertility preferences induced by family policies, are also subject
to diffusion processes. We integrate the role of social effects into a model of fertility de-
cisions and investigate whether and to what extent the effectiveness of family policies is
affected by the social structure. More specifically, family policies may have a direct and
an indirect effect on fertility. The direct effect is based on the alleviation of resource con-
straints, for instance by providing institutional childcare or financial benefits, and allows
parents to achieve their intended level of fertility. The indirect effect of family policies
rests on the assumption that many people imitate or consult with their friends, siblings, or
parents in choosing their intended level of fertility. Local interactions translate into large-
scale patterns that again feed back into small groups (Granovetter 1973). Hence, any
additional birth resulting from family policies may cause an increase in fertility inten-
tions within the peer group of the family giving birth. Policies causing a modest effect on
fertility at the individual level may have a large impact at the macro level due to such peer
effects (Feyrer, Sacerdote, and Stern 2008). Therefore, we have developed a model that
takes social structure into account and investigated the sensitivity of fertility intentions
and realisations with respect to family policies and the parameters that distinguish the so-
cial structures. With this contribution, we aim to resolve the confusion and disagreement
about the effectiveness of family policies by explicitly addressing their twofold impact.
Family policies can affect fertility through their influence on the costs of children,
on individuals’ income levels, and on preferences. Most governments now refrain from
providing universal cash benefits and instead aim to reduce the structural barriers to com-
bining work and childcare. Individuals differ in their needs, tastes, and objectives; but
public policy makers face the challenge of establishing a uniform set of policies to serve
a heterogeneous population. Neither the micro nor the macro level alone can explain
the influence of family policies (imposed at the macro level) on individual childbearing
decisions (taken at the micro level) and the resulting period and cohort fertility patterns
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(observed at the macro level) to its full extent. In order to model the impact of family
policies on fertility decisions, it is necessary to include the decision mechanism at the
micro level, the society at the macro level, the interaction between the micro and macro
levels, and the interactions of individuals within their peer groups. Granovetter (1973)
stated that the analysis of processes in interpersonal networks provides the most fruitful
micro-macro bridge.
Therefore, we apply an agent-based model (ABM) to evaluate the impact of alterna-
tive family policies on fertility in the context of social and institutional structures which
differ across countries. ABMs offer the opportunity to capture individual heterogeneity
with respect to several characteristics and allow us to test hypotheses regarding fertil-
ity behaviour in the context of different cultures and different types of family policies.
ABMs add a behavioural dimension to the analysis (Morand et al. 2010). While the fo-
cus is on the aggregate level (completed fertility), our model is based on the micro level
and explains how aggregate-level properties emerge from the behaviour of the agents at
the micro level. As the recent literature argues that social interaction is a key factor in
shaping fertility decisions and preferences, we explicitly account for peer group effects
in our model. Recently, ABMs have been applied in demography to explain mate choice
and marriage behaviour (Simão and Todd 2003; Todd and Billari 2003; Todd, Billari, and
Simão 2005; Aparicio Diaz and Fent 2006; Billari et al. 2007; Walker and Davis 2013),
fertility (Aparicio Diaz et al. 2011), and migration patterns. Baroni, Žamac, and Öberg
(2009b); Baroni et al. (2009a) applied ABMs to investigate the role of family policies in
Sweden.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2. we present the model structure, in sec-
tion 3. we illustrate the results of the numerical simulations, in section 4. we summarise
our findings and offer some conclusions, in Appendix A we discuss technical details,
empirical data, and the parameter space, in Appendix B we sketch an extension of our
model, in Appendix C we comment on the social muliplier introduced by Becker and
Murphy (2000), and in Appendix D we discuss the animation linked to this paper.
2. The model
In this section we present an agent-based computational model to investigate how social
structures influence the effectiveness of family policies. In particular, we study the impact
of fixed and variable family policies on individual fertility decisions and on the resulting
cohort fertility, intended fertility, and the fertility gap (the difference between intended
fertility and actual fertility) at the aggregate level. We consider a one-sex model contain-
ing only female agents. The crucial features of our model are the agents’ heterogeneity
966 http://www.demographic-research.org
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with respect to age, household budget, parity, and intended fertility; the social network
which links the agents to a small subset of the population and the social effects acting via
that network.4 The agents are endowed with a certain amount of time and money which
they allocate to satisfy their own and their childrens’ needs. To keep the model simple,
we assume that each household considers one unit of time equivalent to γi,t monetary
units. This could mean, for example, that working for one unit of time results in γi,t units
of monetary income, or spending γi,t monetary units for a babysitter or for domestic aid
results in a gain of one time unit. Consequently, we consider only one combined resource
stock wi,t for each household, which is the sum of household income plus the monetary
equivalent of non-working time. The explicit modelling of the social network and social
effects allows us to capture the direct and the indirect effects of family policies. Our
aim is to gain general insights into the impact of family policies on fertility under dif-
ferent assumptions regarding the social structure of a population. While we present the
main mechanisms of the model in this section, we discuss technical details, sources of
empirical data, and the parameter space in Appendix A.
2.1 Initial population
At time t each agent i is characterised by her age xi,t, household budgetwi,t capturing the
sum of the monetary equivalent of the time budget and the monetary income, parity pi,t,
the number of her dependent children (who do not yet have their own income) ni,t, and
her intended fertility fi,t. Agents are assigned a value zi, which determines the quantile
in the age specific income distribution they belong to. We assume that the agents remain
in the same quantile over their entire lives while still progessing to higher income levels
as they age.
2.2 Budget restrictions and children
The agent’s own consumption (of time and money), ci,t, is assumed to be a concave func-
tion of the household budget, ci,t = σ
√
wi,t, and the consumption level of ni,t dependent
children is defined as c(ni,t)i,t = ni,t τ
√
wi,t. Thus, consumption levels of children and
parents rise more slowly than linearly with household budget. This is based on empir-
ical evidence showing that wealthier households have a higher saving rate (i.e. lower
consumption rate) compared to less wealthy households (see e.g. Cutler and Katz 1992;
4We are aware that other characteristics, such as education, also have an impact on childbearing behaviour.
However, we refrain from including additional characteristics as this would come at the cost of additional model
complexity without providing any further insights regarding the impact of the social structure on the effective-
ness of family policies. Moreover, education is highly correlated with income. Therefore, if we include both,
income and education, it will be difficult to disentangle the effects of these two factors.
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Börsch-Supan and Essig 2005; Fessler, Mooslechner, and Schürz 2012). Comparing two
model households with the same number of children but different levels of household
budget shows that expenditures per child are higher in the wealthier household which
corresponds with the quantity quality literature.
Then, the disposable budget yi,t — the difference between household budget wi,t and
consumption — becomes yi,t = wi,t − ci,t − c(ni,t)i,t . If the household’s intended fertility
exceeds the actual parity,
fi,t > pi,t, (1)
and the disposable budget is equal to or greater than the estimated needs of an additional
child,
yi,t ≥ τ√wi,t ⇐⇒ √wi,t ≥ σ + (ni,t + 1)τ, (2)
the agent is exposed to the biological probability (fecundity) of having another child (Leri-
don 2004, 2008). In case of a female birth, a new agent k with age xk,t = 0 is generated.
This new agent is mutually linked to her mother and her sisters (see 2.4).
Each agent ages by one year in each time step, xi,t+1 = xi,t + 1, and children will
eventually turn into adults who earn their own income. The probability of this transi-
tion depends on the agent’s age and is based on age specific labour force participation
rates. After the child’s transition to adulthood, the number of her mother’s dependent
children is reduced by one, but her mother’s parity is unchanged. Moreover, the new
adult agent is assigned her own income level zi, which determines her household budget
wi,t = wi,t(zi, xi,t), her own social network (see 2.4), and her own fertility intentions.
Thereafter, she starts to evaluate her fertility intentions according to the inequalities (1)
and (2).
2.3 Impact of family policies
The aim of the policy maker is to allocate resources to households with children to pro-
vide parents with the means to have and raise children. These resources may be cash
benefits or nonmonetary means, such as publicly subsidised childcare or legislative ac-
tions supporting the combination of working and raising a family. The policy maker may
apply a mix of fixed family policies, bf , providing a fixed service or payment per child,
and family policies proportional to the household budget, bvwi,t. To keep the numerical
simulations tractable and to avoid an excessive number of numerical parameters (see 3.),
we investigate a model using one combined resource that captures the sum of the mone-
tary equivalent of nonmonetary resources (e.g. time) and monetary resources. In the case
of nonmonetary benefits, bf and bvwi,t represent the monetary equivalent from the view-
point of the household. In Appendix B we elaborate on a model that considers monetary
and nonmonetary resources independently.
968 http://www.demographic-research.org
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Any policy mix, bf + bvwi,t, greater than zero partially covers the needs of ni,t depen-
dent children, c(ni,t)i,t = ni,t
(
τ
√
wi,t − bf − bvwi,t
)
, and the disposable budget can be
expressed as yi,t = wi,t − σ√wi,t − ni,t
(
τ
√
wi,t − bf − bvwi,t
)
. The necessary condi-
tion for having an additional child becomes
√
wi,t ≥ σ + (ni,t + 1)
(
τ − b
f
√
wi,t
− bv√wi,t
)
. (3)
This inequality embraces the direct effect of family policies, i.e. the alleviation of the
budget constraints, which enable parents to realise their fertility intentions.
2.4 Endogenous social network
Individuals communicate about various intimate aspects of their lives if they are closely
connected. In the context of our modelling framework, we refer to this group as an agent’s
social network or peer group. Fertility intentions and their realisations are discussed
among individuals who are connected. This social network is of crucial importance be-
cause it connects the micro and the macro levels. Granovetter defined the strength of a
tie as a combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy, and the
reciprocal services which characterise the tie. The strength of the tie connecting two in-
dividuals is related to the similarity of the connected individuals. Moreover, the stronger
the tie between two individuals, the larger the proportion of individuals to whom they will
both be tied (Granovetter 1973).
The mechanisms generating the endogenous social network in this paper are grounded
on these theoretical considerations. The similarity of the agents’ characteristics has an
impact on the probability of being chosen to join an agent’s social network (Watts, Dodds,
and Newman 2002; Aparicio Diaz et al. 2011). We consider age, income, and intended
fertility as the characteristics that determine an agent’s social background. Moreover, we
assume a certain degree of network transitivity or clustering, i.e. the tendency that two
agents who are both connected to the same agent establish a mutual relationship over time
(the friends of my friends are also my friends).
Although the mechanism generating the network is based on socioeconomic and de-
mographic similarities, ascribed relations such as family relations and kinship are also
captured since every agent is linked to her mother and to her children (see 2.2). Com-
bining this with the built-in network transitivity, the probability of establishing links with
sisters, the grandmother, and grandchildren is high compared to the chance of relation-
ships with completely unrelated individuals. In a further step the probability of establish-
ing a link with aunts or cousins is higher than the probability of establishing a link with
unrelated individuals, but not as high as the chance of forming relationships with closer
relatives.
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2.5 Social effects and intended fertility
Each agent has an intended fertility defined as the sum of current parity and the intended
number of additional children. The intended fertility may be altered due to social learning
and social influence imposed by the peer group. Like Montgomery and Casterline (1996)
we combine social learning and social influence to general social effects. We assume
that interpersonal communication about individual fertility preferences, together with the
imitation of peers, may shape preferences. Thus, the dynamics of intended fertility are
driven by diffusion via local ties. The adaptations of individual fertility intentions capture
the indirect effect of family policies. Parents who have additional children because of the
direct effect (see 2.3) may subsequently exert social effects on their peers, resulting in an
increase in their fertility intentions.
The network influence operates along two dimensions: the degree to which individ-
uals express their opinions or perform certain types of behaviour, and the closeness and
strength of a relationship. We assume that each link to a peer with a parity higher (lower)
than the intended fertility of the focal individual i implies a chance that i will increase
(decrease) her own fertility intention. Since we do not explicitly trace the strength of ties
connecting individuals, we assume constant probabilities for positive or negative influ-
ence. Thus, each tie connecting two individuals may be strong or weak depending on
random numbers generated during the simulation.
Our model continues the approaches of Rosero-Bixby and Casterline (1993) and Mont-
gomery and Casterline (1996), who applied social learning and social influence mecha-
nisms to model the adoption of contraceptive use. Rosero-Bixby and Casterline (1993)
used a differential equation model based on the classic, deterministic diffusion model
describing the adoption of an innovation. This approach describes the dynamics of the
number of adopters at the population level. Such a framework is capable of consider-
ing the interactions among peers, but it focuses entirely on population averages and does
not allow for individual heterogeneity. Montgomery and Casterline (1996) developed
an empirical specification to estimate the impact of socioeconomic determinants, family
planning programmes, and peer group behaviour on the individual propensity to adopt
contraception. Aparicio Diaz et al. (2011), on the other hand, used an agent-based model
to study the impact of peer group interactions on the shift in age specific fertility between
1984 and 2004.
3. Simulation results
To explore the simulation model described in the previous section, we generate six dis-
tinct initial populations of agents endowed with the characteristics age, parity, number of
970 http://www.demographic-research.org
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dependent children, intended fertility, and household budget. For all six initial populations
the distributions of the individual characteristics are based on the same probabilities but
the actual realisations are different. All initial populations consist of 5000 agents. Since
we are interested in the role of social structure with regard to the impact of family policies,
we vary the level of fixed and proportional family policies bf and bv , homophily α, the
degree of network transitivity pr2, the weight of intended fertility 2, and the strength of
positive and negative social influence pr3 and pr4. In particular, we set 1 = 1, τ = 2.3,
σ = 2.5, κ = 0.7, α = 0.2 : 0.4 : 1.0,5 2 = 0 : 3 : 3, bf = 0 : 0.2 : 2.0,
bv = 0 : 0.04 : 0.28, pr2 = 0.1 : 0.3 : 0.7, and pr3 − pr4 = −0.06 : 0.02 : 0.06. This
results in 123,552 different sets of parameter combinations. We discuss these parameters
and their feasible ranges in Appendix A. We combine each of these parameter combina-
tions with each of the six initial populations, which means a total of 741,312 simulations,
and run each simulation for 100 time steps (years). This may be interpreted as applying
88 different sets of family policies (determined by the parameters bf and bv) on 8424 dif-
ferent societies (represented by α, 2, pr2, pr3, pr3 − pr4, and the initial population). For
each simulation run we record completed cohort fertility, intended fertility, and the fertil-
ity gap (the difference between intended and completed cohort fertility) on the aggregate
level. This section summarises the results obtained from these simulations.
Agent-based simulations allow for experiments that would not be feasible in the real
world, and these experiments help us to visualise trends and relationships. The medium
range of parameter settings and the medium range of fertility outcomes represent some-
what realistic scenarios, while the extreme ends of the parameter range are applied to cap-
ture the interdependencies between family policies, network characteristics, and fertility.
Because actual fertility depends on the realisation of fertility intentions, we investigate
the two components intended fertility and fertility gap independently. The fertility gap
indicates to what extent fertility intentions result in actual fertility behaviour. Individuals
adapt their fertility intentions if they interact with individuals with higher or lower par-
ity. Therefore, the fertility gap allows us to measure the direct effect of family policies,
and the comparison of fertility intentions resulting from different policies allows us to
measure the indirect effect.
Figure 1 depicts completed cohort fertility, intended fertility, and the fertility gap of
those birth cohorts finishing their reproductive period during the last 10 years of the sim-
ulation versus fixed (graphs in the left column) and variable (graphs in the right column)
family policies.
5This means the parameter α is varied from 0.2 to 1.0 by increments of 0.4
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Figure 1: Completed cohort fertility, intended fertility, and fertility gap by
fixed, bf , and variable, bv , family policies.
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Note: Both types of family policies have a positive impact on cohort fertility and intended fertility, and a negative
impact on the fertility gap.
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Due to the large number of simulations, the relatively small size of the agent popu-
lations (even small countries like e.g. Andorra, Monaco or San Marino have a lot more
than 5000 inhabitants), and the long time span of 100 years, there are some outliers devi-
ating strongly from the number of simulations. That is why we present averages of many
simulation runs in the graphs. Here and in the following figures, the solid line always
represents the average over all of the simulations. In the left column, the dashed, dot-
ted, and dot-dashed lines show the averages over all simulations with the same level of
proportional family policies (bv), and in the right column they depict the averages over
all simulations with the same level of fixed family policies (bf ). Both the fixed and the
variable family policies appear to have a positive influence on cohort fertility, a small
positive impact on intended fertility, and a negative impact on the fertility gap. Because
the impact of family policies on the fertility gap appears to be more pronounced than the
impact on intended fertility, we may conclude that, in our simulation model and for the
specific parameter range, the direct effect of family policies is stronger than the indirect
effect.
In addition to these graphical visualisations, we present statistical estimates on the
impact of family policies in Tables 1 and 2. All of the regression results are based on
simulations, and we use ordinary least squares estimation. The dependent variables are
completed cohort fertility (ctfr), intended fertility (f ), and the fertility gap (gap) of those
birth cohorts finishing their reproductive period during the last ten years of the simulation.
The explanatory variables are the monetary equivalents of fixed family policies (unitbf )
and proportional family policies (unitbv) measured in monetary units per child per year.
Table 1: Estimation of the impact of fixed, unitbf , and variable, unitbv,
family policies on completed cohort fertility, intended fertility, and
the fertility gap, standard errors in parentheses.
dependent
variable
ctfr f gap
.217598*** .0762465*** -.1413515***
unitbf
(.0016135) (.0024278) (.0009583)
.0673663*** .0193482*** -.0480182***
unitbv
(.0002631) (.0003959) (.0001562)
Adjusted R2 0.0979 0.0043 0.1311
Number of observations 741312 741312 741312
*** significant at 1 percent
The regressions confirm that both types of family policies have a significant positive
impact on cohort fertility and intended fertility, and a significant negative impact on the
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fertility gap. Fixed family policies show a stronger impact. The coefficient for unitbf
explaining cohort fertility, 0.217598, can be interpreted as demonstrating that increasing
public investments in children by 1000 Euro per child and year would increase cohort
fertility by about 0.22. However, this result should be interpreted with caution for two
reasons. Firstly, all family policy measures in our model refer to combined resources
capturing the sum of cash plus the monetary equivalent of nonmonetary policies from the
viewpoint of the household. Secondly, the parameters determing the social structure do
not only influence the fertility level but also the impact of family policies. We will show
this in Table 2.
Figures 2 and 3 again depict cohort fertility, intended fertility, and the fertility gap
versus fixed and proportional family policies. In Figure 2 dashed, dotted, and dot-dashed
lines indicate different levels of agents’ homophily α, in Figure 3 they indicate the differ-
ence between the probabilities of being influenced by peers with higher or lower parity,
pr3 − pr4 (see A5).
The graphs reveal that homophily α has a visible impact on completed cohort fertility
and intended fertility but only a small impact on the fertility gap. Thus, we conclude that
the level of homophily in a society has an impact on the indirect effect of family poli-
cies, i.e. on the transmission of changes in fertility intentions caused by family policies.
The difference pr3 − pr4 has a positive impact on completed cohort fertility and on the
fertility gap, and a strong positive impact on intended fertility. Thus, the influence mech-
anism determined by the parameters pr3 and pr4 can alter the indirect effect of family
policies. Figure 4 depicts cohort fertility, intended fertility, and the fertility gap versus
the difference pr3 − pr4. In the left (right) column, the dashed, dotted, and dot-dashed
lines represent the averages over all simulations with the same level of variable (fixed)
family policies. These graphs again illustrate the strong positive impact of the difference
pr3 − pr4 on the three measures. Moreover, the graphs in the second row show that the
impact of pr3 − pr4 on the indirect effect of policies exceeds the impact of the policy mix
(because the range of intended fertility captured by each of the curves is larger than the
gap between the curves). The graphs in the third row show that the direct effect of fixed
and proportional family policies (depicted by the distances between the lines) and the
impact of pr3 − pr4 on the fertility gap (illustrated by the range captured by each single
line) are both very strong. Finally, all six graphs in this figure reveal a nonlinear impact
of pr3 − pr4. We will consider this nonlinearity in the following statistical investigation.
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Figure 2: Completed cohort fertility, intended fertility, and the fertility gap
by fixed, bf , and variable, bv , family policies and by homophily α.
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Note: Homophily appears to have a positive impact on completed cohort fertility and intended fertility. The overall
impact of homophily is small compared to the impact of the policy mix.
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Figure 3: Completed cohort fertility, intended fertility, and fertility gap by
fixed, bf , and variable, bv , family policies and pr3 − pr4, the dif-
ference between the probabilities of positive and negative social
influence.
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Note: The difference has a positive impact on completed cohort fertility and on the fertility gap, and a strong
positive impact on intended fertility.
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Figure 4: Completed cohort fertility, intended fertility, and fertility gap by
pr3 − pr4, the difference between the probabilities of positive and
negative social influence and by fixed, bf , and variable, bv , family
policies.
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Note: The difference has a strong positive impact on completed cohort fertility and on the fertility gap, and an
extremely strong positive impact on intended fertility that actually exceeds the impact of the policy mix.
http://www.demographic-research.org 977
Fent, Aparicio & Prskawetz: Family policies in the context of low fertility and social structure
In Table 2, we present statistical estimates on the impact of child support on fer-
tility, controlling for network parameters and for social effects. Again, the regression
results are based on simulations and we use ordinary least squares estimation. As in
the previous regressions, the dependent variables are completed cohort fertility (ctfr),
intended fertility (f ), and the fertility gap (gap) of those birth cohorts finishing their re-
productive period during the last ten years of the simulation. The explanatory variables
are unitbf , unitbv, dummy variables initpop2, . . . , initpop6 controlling for the ini-
tial pupulation used for each particular simulation run (initial population 1 serves as the
reference group), α, pr2, 2, pr3, and pr3 − pr4. Moreover, we include the interaction
terms unitbf ∗ unitbv, α ∗ unitbf , α ∗ unitbv, pr2 ∗ unitbf , pr2 ∗ unitbv, 2 ∗ unitbf ,
2 ∗ unitbv, (pr3 − pr4) ∗ unitbf , and (pr3 − pr4) ∗ unitbv; and the quadratic terms
unitbf2, unitbv2, and (pr3 − pr4)2 to control for nonlinear effects.
Table 2: Estimation of the impact of family policies and parameters deter-
mining the social structure on completed cohort fertility, intended
fertility, and the fertility gap, standard errors in parentheses
dependent
variable
ctfr f gap
0.1545912*** 0.0769988*** -0.0775923***
unitbf
(0.0036223) (0.0058995) (0.0029992)
0.1219109*** 0.0933596*** -0.0285513***
unitbv
(0.0005237) (0.0008529) (0.0004336)
0.0166549*** 0.005283** -0.0113719***
unitbf2
(0.001333) (0.002171) (0.0011037)
-0.0044754*** -0.0056254*** -0.0011501***
unitbv2
(0.0000276) (0.000045) (0.0000229)
0.0046409*** -0.0021794*** -0.0068203***
unitbf ∗ unitbv
(0.0001936) (0.0003154) (0.0001603)
0.5934949*** 0.7079207*** 0.1144258***
initpop2
(0.001634) (0.0026612) (0.0013529)
2.028357*** 3.092795*** 1.064438***
initpop3
(0.001633) (0.0026596) (0.0013521)
1.670658*** 2.363395*** 0.6927377***
initpop4
(0.0016337) (0.0026607) (0.0013527)
1.667212*** 2.359704*** 0.6924919***
initpop5
(0.0016338) (0.0026609) (0.0013528)
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Table 2: (Continued)
dependent
variable
ctfr f gap
1.671556*** 2.364802*** 0.6932458***
initpop6
(0.0016338) (0.0026608) (0.0013527)
0.1508017*** 0.1296827*** -0.021119***
α
(0.0035742) (0.0058212) (0.0029594)
-0.0087852*** -0.0149187*** -0.0061335***
α ∗ unitbf
(0.0022807) (0.0037145) (0.0018884)
-0.0024081*** -0.0030503*** -0.0006423**
α ∗ unitbv
(0.0003724) (0.0006065) (0.0003083)
-0.0102794** -0.017301** -0.0070216*
pr2 (0.0047677) (0.0077649) (0.0039476)
0.0026065 0.0050076 0.0024011
pr2 ∗ unitbf (0.0030405) (0.0049519) (0.0025175)
0.0001563 0.0011218 0.0009655**
pr2 ∗ unitbv (0.0004958) (0.0008075) (0.0004105)
-0.0023557*** -0.0017662 0.0005895
2 (0.0007785) (0.001268) (0.0006446)
0.0013926*** 0.0010154 -0.0003773
2 ∗ unitbf (0.0004965) (0.0008086) (0.0004111)
0.0004723*** 0.0003697*** -0.0001026
2 ∗ unitbv (0.000081) (0.0001319) (0.000067)
2.297383*** 0.9056272*** -1.391756***
pr3 (0.0073055) (0.0118982) (0.006049)
2.269449*** 6.23648*** 3.967031***
pr3 − pr4 (0.0299195) (0.0487284) (0.0247732)
26.72111*** 42.07791*** 15.35679***
(pr3 − pr4)2 (0.3443813) (0.5608764) (0.2851463)
0.4931002*** 0.1841282*** -0.308972***
(pr3 − pr4) ∗ unitbf (0.0190671) (0.0310536) (0.0157875)
0.3081202*** 0.2467376*** -0.0613826***
(pr3 − pr4) ∗ unitbv (0.0031235) (0.0050871) (0.0025862)
-0.3477147*** 0.0317416*** 0.3794563***constant
(0.0039059) (0.0063614) (0.0032341)
Adjusted R2 0.8078 0.7515 0.6402
Number of observations 741 312 741 312 741 312
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent
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As in the previous estimation, unitbf and unitbv have a significant positive impact
on cohort fertility and intended fertility, and a significant negative impact on the fertility
gap. Variable family policies contribute more to the indirect effect (f ), while for fixed
family policies the direct and indirect effects are nearly equal. The quadratic terms and
the interaction of fixed and variable family policies are strongly significant but the coef-
ficients are small. The dummy variables representing the initial populations have a big
impact and are strongly significant. Thus, the initial conditions at the beginning of the
simulation run determine a large portion of the results at the end of the simulation. Ho-
mophily α has a significant positive impact on cohort fertility and intended fertility, and
a significant but small negative impact on the fertility gap. This means homophily op-
erates mostly on the indirect effect. The interactions of homophily with family policies
α*unitbf and α*unitbv are strongly significant and the coefficients are all negative and
small. Consequently, societies characterised by a high level of homophily tend to higher
levels of fertility, the impact of policies on the direct effect (gap) is slightly stronger, and
the impact of policies in such societies on the indirect effect (f ) is weaker. Network tran-
sitivity, pr2, has a negative impact on completed cohort fertility, intended fertility, and
on the fertility gap, and the interactions of transitivity with family policies have a pos-
itive impact on all three dependent variables. Like in the case of homophily, this may
be interpreted such that societies with a high level of network transitivity tend to lower
fertility levels, the impact of policies on the indirect effect (f ) is stronger, and the impact
of policies on the indirect effect (gap) is weaker. However, in the case of transitivity, not
only are the respective coefficients small, but the level of significance is also weak. The
weight of intended fertility for calculating the social distance in equation (10), 2, has a
small but strongly significant negative impact on cohort fertility, and no significant impact
on the other measures. Thus, an increase in 2 slightly reduces cohort fertility. The inter-
actions with policies, on the other hand, mitigate that effect. The coefficients for cohort
fertility have a positive sign and are strongly significant. As expected, the probability of
being positively influenced by a peer with higher parity, pr3, has a positive impact on
intended fertility. Moreover, the impact on the fertility gap is significant and negative,
resulting in an even stronger positive and significant impact on cohort fertility. The differ-
ence between the probabilities of being influenced by peers with higher or lower parities,
(pr3 − pr4), has a strong positive impact on intended fertility and cohort fertility, but
also on the fertility gap. Thus, the increased intentions cannot always be fulfilled due to
the budgetary constraints which counteract high fertility intentions. The quadratic term
(pr3 − pr4)2 has an even stronger positive impact on the three dependent variables, con-
firming the convex curves depicted in Figure 4. The interaction (pr3 − pr4) ∗ unitbf has
a significant positive impact on completed cohort fertility and intended fertility, and a sig-
nificant negative impact on the fertility gap. The same holds true for the interaction with
variable family policies, (pr3 − pr4) ∗ unitbv. Thus, the difference (pr3 − pr4) supports
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the direct and indirect effect of both fixed and variable family policies resulting in higher
cohort fertility and a smaller fertility gap. The estimated coefficients show that the indi-
rect effect of proportional policies is more sensitive to social effects than is the indirect
effect of fixed policies. This is in agreement with our results regarding the social multi-
plier (see C). The direct effect of fixed policies, on the other hand, is more sensitive to
social effects than is the direct effect of proportional policies.
The coefficients listed in the second column of Table 2 (completed cohort fertility
ctfr) are based on the empirical specification
ctfr = β0 + β1unitbf + β2unitbv + β3unitbf
2 + β4unitbv
2 + β5unitbf ∗ unitbv
+ β6 initpop2 + β7 initpop3 + β8 initpop4 + β9 initpop5 + β10 initpop6
+ β11α+ β12α ∗ unitbf + β13α ∗ unitbv
+ β14pr2 + β15pr2 ∗ unitbf + β16pr2 ∗ unitbv
+ β172 + β182 ∗ unitbf + β192 ∗ unitbv
+ β20pr3 + β21(pr3 − pr4) + β22(pr3 − pr4)2
+ β23(pr3 − pr4) ∗ unitbf + β24(pr3 − pr4) ∗ unitbv. (4)
Then, in a given society characterised by numerical parameters α, pr2, 2, pr3, and pr4,
the marginal impact of one monetary unit of fixed family policies (a monetary equivalent
of 1000 Euro) on completed cohort fertility can be estimated as the partial derivative of
(4) with respect to unitbf ,
ctfrunitbf = β1 + β3unitbf + β5unitbv
+ β12α+ β15pr2 + β182 + β23(pr3 − pr4), (5)
and in the same way the marginal impact of one monetary unit of variable family policies
on completed cohort fertility may be depicted in the form
ctfrunitbv = β2 + β4unitbv + β5unitbf
+ β13α+ β16pr2 + β192 + β24(pr3 − pr4). (6)
Taking together the numerical results from Table 2, the marginal impacts in (5) and (6)
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become
ctfrunitbf = .1545912 + .0166549 ∗ unitbf + .0046409 ∗ unitbv
−.0087852 ∗ α+ .0026065 ∗ pr2 + .0013926 ∗ 2
+.4931002 ∗ (pr3 − pr4) (7)
ctfrunitbv = .1219109− .0044754 ∗ unitbv + .0046409 ∗ unitbf
−.0024081 ∗ α+ .0001563 ∗ pr2 + .0004723 ∗ 2
+.3081202 ∗ (pr3 − pr4). (8)
Applying the numerical parameters used for the simulations, the mean value of the
marginal impact ctfrunitbf is .195 and the mean value of ctfrunitbv is .0978. Hence,
providing a monetary equivalent of 1000 Euro per child and year for fixed family policies
could raise cohort fertility on average by almost 0.2 and supplying a monetary equiva-
lent of 1000 Euro per child and year in terms of proportional family policies could raise
cohort fertility on average by nearly 0.1. Depending on the magnitude of the numerical
parameters, the pure impact of family policies given by the constant term in (7) and (8)
may not only be amplified or damped but even reversed in extreme cases. Comparing
the estimated coefficients in Table 1 with the corresponding coefficients in Table 2 re-
veals that neglecting the social structure in our simulation model and parameter space
results in an overestimation of the impact of fixed policies on completed cohort fertility
and on the fertility gap (the coefficients for intended fertility do not differ very much), an
underestimation of the impact of proportional policies on completed cohort fertility and
on intended fertility, and an overestimation of the impact of proportional policies on the
fertility gap.
4. Summary and conclusions
We study the impact of fixed and proportional family policies on intended fertility, on
the realisation of intended fertility, and on the resulting completed cohort fertility. In
particular, we investigate whether the structure of a society represented by parameters
specifying the social network and social effects has the potential to alter the role of family
policies. In our modelling framework, individuals are characterised by their sociodemo-
graphic characteristics age, household budget, parity, the number of dependent children,
and intended fertility. The agents are closely linked to a set of other agents with whom
they discuss their fertility intentions and the realisation of their plans. We refer to this
group as the agent’s social network. The whole agent population constitutes the soci-
ety. The agents are not directly linked to those agents who do not belong to their social
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network, but any agent may indirectly influence any other agent via intermediaries.6 The
above-mentioned characteristics, as well as the family policy measures and social effects
transmitted via the social network, have an impact on the agents’ fertility intentions and
behaviour. The model allows us to carry out experiments to test various combinations of
childcare benefits and combine them with different assumptions regarding the underlying
social structure.
Our simulations reveal that both fixed and proportional family policies have positive
effects on completed cohort fertility and intended fertility and a negative impact on the
fertility gap. These findings are in line with empirical studies (Gauthier and Hatzius 1997;
Björklund 2006; Gauthier 2007; Feyrer, Sacerdote, and Stern 2008; Egger and Radulescu
2012) and microsimulation models (Kalb and Thoresen 2010). Social networks and social
effects are also found to affect fertility, which coincides with empirical results (Bühler
and Philipov 2005; Philipov, Spéder, and Billari 2006; Balbo and Mills 2011) and with
simulation models (Zamac, Hallberg, and Lindh 2010). Moreover, proportional policies
contribute more to the indirect effect (increase in intended fertility) while the contribution
of fixed policies to the direct effect (reduction of the gap between intended fertility and
completed cohort fertility) and indirect effect are approximately equal. Consequently,
the indirect effect of proportional policies is more sensitive to social effects than is the
indirect effect of fixed policies. The direct effect of fixed policies, on the other hand,
is more sensitive to social effects than is the direct effect of proportional policies. The
social multipliers which can be computed for any given level of social effects allows us to
quantify to what extent the effectiveness of family policies is mitigated or reinforced by
social effects (see C). Our findings that the probability of being positively influenced by
a peer with higher parity and the difference between the probabilities of being influenced
by peers with higher or lower parities have positive effects on completed cohort fertility
and intended fertility, have empirical support from Balbo and Mills (2011), who showed
that increased social pressure from parents, relatives, and friends increases the likelihood
that a woman will plan to have another child.
Several parameters determining the network and social effects do not only influence
fertility itself, but also the effectiveness of family policies, often in a detrimental way. The
key element of our model is the combination of family policies and social effects. This
allows us to investigate not only the individual effects of policies and social networks
but also their interactions. For example, while a higher degree of homophily among the
network partners appears to have a positive effect on fertility (intentions and realisations),
family policies may be less effective in such a society. Similar results hold for the pa-
rameter that characterises the weight put on intended fertility in the selection of the social
6Harary, Norman, and Cartwright (1965) use the term “bridge” for those links that provide the only connection
between two otherwise unconnected subgroups of the population, and Granovetter (1973) defines “local bridges”
as those links that provide the shortest connection between two subgroups.
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network, and for the parameters that determine the social influence on intended fertility
among network partners. We infer that empirical studies gain from the inclusion of vari-
ables depicting the social structure. Kalb and Thoresen (2010), for instance, compare
the Australian support scheme which is based on means-tested or income-tested trans-
fers and the Nordic scheme of subsidised non-parental care and a universal child benefit
schedule. Means-tested transfers and subsidised non-parental care correspond to propor-
tional policies in our framework and universal family income support is the equivalent to
fixed family policies. Kalb and Thoresen investigate the impact of policiy changes in the
context of different labour market characteristics and different behavioural responses in
the two countries. They find that reduced childcare fees encourage female labour supply
but do not contribute to a more equal distribution of income. They conclude that family
policies that redistribute income are more preferable in the Australian context. Parr and
Guest (2011) use a longitudinal survey to isolate the effects of family policy changes from
general socioeconomic and demographic trends. They conclude that the effect of policy
changes is small and not statistically significant.
The main conclusion of our model and simulation exercise is clearly the role of so-
cial interaction for the effectiveness of family policies in addition to the direct effect of
social interaction on fertility. As well as family policies, social interaction may also in-
fluence other determinants of fertility. E.g. the role of economic uncertainty for fertility
may be different depending on the social structure of the population. More generally, our
modelling framework offers a tool to investigate and disentangle indirect effects of fer-
tility determinants from direct ones. In our case the indirect effects work through social
interaction and the determinant we are interested in is family policy. However, instead
of social interaction or maybe in addition to social interaction other aspects of a society,
such as attitudes, norms, and values, may induce an indirect effect on fertility. Similarly
the fertility determinant we are interested in, i.e. family policy, may be any other or a set
of other family determinants.
A comprehensive review of fertility determinants in advanced societies is given in
Balbo, Billari, and Mills (2013). Obviously our model includes only a selection of vari-
ables influencing fertility. At the micro/individual level important extensions of our model
are the consideration of partners and employment uncertainties. At the meso level not
only social interaction but social capital and place of residence may be important charac-
teristics to include as well. At the macro level, additional components of family policies
(e.g. entitlement to monetary transfers, maternal and paternal leave periods), economic
trends, changes in values and attitudes, and the advancement in reproductive technologies
are important determinants to be included.
Our simulation model allows for any variation of social networks and social effects
which may have an impact on the diffusion of fertility intentions, and, therefore, the indi-
rect effect of family policies. Because empirical research on the effects of social capital
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and social pressure on fertility intentions has identified significant cross-country differ-
ences (Philipov, Spéder, and Billari 2006; Balbo and Mills 2011), the correct assessment
of the effectiveness of family policies requires controlling for social effects. Knack and
Keefer (1997) found marked cross country variations in social capital; Wright (1997)
noted that the level of homophily varies from country to country; and Kalmijn (1998)
inferred that educational homogamy in marriage increased strongly in the United States,
but that most countries showed no trend, and that some showed a decrease. Consequently,
attempts to transfer a certain policy mix that has proved successful in one country at a
certain time to another country or society while ignoring differences in social structure
may fail. Family policies can only be successful if they explicitly take into account the
characteristics of the society to which they are applied. For instace our simulation shows
that in the presence of strong positive social effects fixed policies reduce the fertility gap
more effectively, while proportional policies increase intended fertility and vice versa.
We further conclude that cross-country comparisons of different types of family poli-
cies should be seen in the context of the social and economic structures. The impact
of a certain policy depends on the subset of policies being investigated but comprehen-
sive experiments that study any and all possible policy mixes are not feasible in the real
world. Moreover, empirical studies addressing the impact of social learning, social pres-
sure, and social capital on fertility and fertility intentions show a strong influence of the
social structure on intended and actual fertility. We combine the impact of family policies,
social networks, and social effects into one unifying framework in order to gain a better
understanding of how family policies interact with social and societal structures.
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Appendix
A Technical details of the model
In this section we elaborate on the technical details, on the empirical data we used to ob-
tain the distributions of the agents’ characteristics, and on the feasible parameter space of
the model presented in Section 2.. Although we use Austrian data to obtain the distribu-
tions of age, parity, income, and intended fertility, the model should not be interpreted as
an accurate microsimulation of Austrian society. The intention is to get realistic distribu-
tions which resemble typical Western European low-fertility societies.
A1 Initial population
We use census data to obtain an initial age and parity distribution. The parity distribution
and the distribution of the age of the children are based on data on the mothers’ age at
birth in 2008.7 Moreover, we apply data from the income tax statistics8 for the distribution
of household income. We use age-specific data on the 25% quantile, the median value,
and the 75% quantile of the annual net income; and interpolate the data. We then use data
from the Gender and Generation Survey (GGS) to estimate the distribution of the desire
for additional children given the agents’ age and parity. We define the probability pimi that
agent i wants at least m additional children (1 ≤ m ≤ 8) and use the logit model
logit(pimi ) = β
m
0 + β
m
1 xi + β
m
2 pi (9)
for each m to estimate the respective probabilities from the GGS data for the initial pop-
ulation.
A2 Budget restrictions and children
The numerical parameters σ and τ need to be nonnegative and sufficiently small. Negative
values would correspond to negative consumption needs, which are unrealistic and would
allow for infinite consumption and, in case of negative τ , for an infinite number of chil-
dren. Excessively high values would not allow for any children. For instance, σ = √wi,t
(or τ = √wi,t, respectively) means that the agent’s entire budget is needed to cover her
own needs (the needs of one child).
In case of a successful live birth, a new agent is generated with a probability depend-
ing on the Austrian sex ratio at birth, since our simulation only keeps track of female
7STATISTIK AUSTRIA, Statistik der natürlichen Bevölkerungsbewegung 2008
8STATISTIK AUSTRIA, Allgemeiner Einkommensbericht 2008
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individuals. Male children are not implemented as agents within the artificial population,
but they contribute to the parity and number of dependent children of their mothers.
Since the distribution of fertility preferences in the artificial society may change over
time, we compute for each m the aggregate share of adult agents with parity pi < m
who desire at least m children, Πmt . We use these shares to update the parameters β
m
0 in
equation (9) every five years according to
βm0,t = β
m
0
log
Πmt
1−Πmt
log
Πm0
1−Πm0
,
and the new adult agent’s intended fertility is assigned according to the probabilities
pimi =
exp(βm0,t + β
m
1 xi)
1 + exp(βm0,t + β
m
1 xi)
.
Finally, agents die off with a probability based on the Austrian female life table.
A3 Impact of family policies
From inequalities (1) and (2) it becomes immediately clear that family policies can be
effective for those households with unsatisfied fertility preferences and with a funding
gap, i.e. households with a disposable budget that is insufficient to meet the needs of
an additional child. Thus, it is possible to calculate the level of support needed to in-
crease parity by one for each household. However, due to the heterogeneous distribution
of (unsatisfied) fertility preferences (which are dynamically adapted via social effects,
see 2.5 and A5), the heterogeneous distribution of resources, and the nonlinear relation-
ship between resources and needs, it is not possible to calculate the direct impact of family
policies at the aggregate level analytically.
The parameters bf and bv need to be nonnegative. Negative values would mean that
the policymaker imposes additional costs or burdens on parents, and the derivation of the
neccesary condition for having an additional child (see 2.3) would become invalid. On
the other hand, an upper limit for meaningful family policies can be identified at the level
at which the family supports per child equal the needs per child, bf + bvwi,t = τ
√
wi,t.
A4 Endogenous social network
The social distance between agents i and j is defined as
dij = |xi − xj |+ 1 |zi − zj |+ 2 |fi − fj | . (10)
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The parameter 1 determines the weight of the income difference and 2 determines the
weight of the differences in the intended fertility of the two agents. Differences in income
or intended fertility are ignored when setting the respective parameter zero. To build up
the social network, an agent chooses a distance d with probability pr1(d) = c exp(−αd)
and then picks an agent with distance d as a new friend (Watts, Dodds, and Newman 2002;
Aparicio Diaz et al. 2011). For this choice, we define another probability pr2, which
determines whether this new friend is chosen among those individuals who are not linked
to any of the agent’s peers or only among those individuals who are linked to at least
one of the agent’s friends. This parameter allows us to adjust the degree of transitivity in
the social network which to some degree also serves as a measure of the strength of the
ties. The constant c is a normalisation parameter to ensure that the probabilities of all of
the feasible distances sum up to one, and the parameter α determines the agents’ level of
homophily. If α is assigned high values, the chances of a connection forming between
similar individuals become high. The selecting agent is also added to the network of
the selected agent. Thus, we assume a mutual friendship relation which means that the
underlying network topology is represented by an undirected graph. This procedure is
repeated until the desired number of peers, s, is found. This desired network size is
drawn from a log normal distribution (see for instance Dunbar and Spoors 1995, Fig. 1)
with mean s¯ = 10 and rounded to the nearest integer.
The weights 1 and 2 have to be nonnegative but may take any finite number. Very
high values mean a dominance of one characteristic in determining the social distance.
The parameter α determining the level of homphily may also take any nonnegative value.
The probability pr2 may take any value from the closed interval [0, 1].
A5 Social effects and intended fertility
At time t agent i has an intended fertility of fi,t, which must be a nonnegative integer,
and is defined as the sum of current parity pi,t and the intended additional children. Since
we need an approach based at the individual level that allows for nonlinear interaction of
positive and negative influence, we implement social effects similar to Goldenberg et al.
(2007). We assume that intended fertility increases (decreases) by one with probabil-
ity pr3 (pr4) due to the social effects exerted by a peer with a parity greater (less) than
the agent’s intended fertility. Then, we compute pi+i (pi
−
i ), the number of agents j who
are linked to i and have a parity greater (less) than the intended fertility of agent i, i.e.
pj,t > fi,t (pj,t < fi,t). Based on these calculations, we compute the probabilities for an
agent to be positively or negatively influenced by at least one agent from the peer group,9
9If pr3 is the probability of increasing intended fertility due to meeting one peer with a higher parity, then
(1 − pr3) is the probability of not increasing intended fertility despite this one peer, (1 − pr3)pi
+
i is the
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p+i,t = 1− (1− pr3)pi
+
i and p−i,t = 1− (1− pr4)pi
−
i . Individuals may be exposed to posi-
tive influence, negative influence, both positive and negative influence, or neither. Hence,
the probability of being only positively (negatively) influenced becomes (1 − p−i,t)p+i,t
(respectively (1 − p+i,t)p−i,t) and the probability of being both positively and negatively
influenced is p+i,tp
−
i,t. We use the parameter κ (or (1 − κ)) to determine the fraction of
individuals who increase (decrease) their intended fertility in the case of mixed influence.
Then the probabilities of increasing, decreasing or keeping the intended fertility constant
are
pi(fi,t+1 = fi,t + 1) = (1− p−i,t)p+i,t + κp+i,tp−i,t
pi(fi,t+1 = fi,t − 1) = (1− p+i,t)p−i,t + (1− κ)p+i,tp−i,t
pi(fi,t+1 = fi,t) = (1− p+i,t)(1− p−i,t) .
The probabilities pr3 and pr4 and the parameter κmay take any value from the closed
interval [0, 1]. In the case of new products any adopter may influence friends to adopt
this product as well (Goldenberg et al. 2007); in our model, actual births are assumed
to influence fertility intentions, which do not need to be realised immediately. Thus,
we allow for different probabilities for the increase and decrease since the actual parity
within the network is usually lower than the desired fertility of the peers. Using the same
probability for increasing and decreasing results in a steady bias towards lower levels of
intended fertility.
B An extended model with two resources
In the case of two scarce resources — for example, time and money — the household
budget, consumption needs, and family supports provided by the public administration
(family policies) must be considered for both components. Let us assume household i
has a budget of ui,t units of time and vi,t units of money at time t. The agent’s own
consumption of time, c˜i,t, and money, cˆi,t, are assumed to be concave functions of the
respective household budgets (here and in the following ˜ denotes quantities of time and
ˆ refers to quantities of money),
c˜i,t = σ˜i,t
√
ui,t and cˆi,t = σˆi,t
√
vi,t ,
and the respective consumption levels of ni,t dependent children are defined as
c˜(ni,t) = ni,t τ˜i,t
√
ui,t and cˆ(ni,t) = ni,t τˆi,t
√
vi,t .
probability of not increasing intended fertility despite pi+i peers with higher parities, and 1 − (1 − pr3)pi
+
i is
the probability of increasing intended fertility when exposed to pi+i peers with higher parities.
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Therefore, the disposable budgets y˜i,t and yˆi,t — the difference between the budget and
consumption, which can be used, for example, to cover the needs of an additional child
— become
y˜i,t = ui,t − c˜i,t − c˜(ni,t)i,t and yˆi,t = vi,t − cˆi,t − cˆ(ni,t)i,t .
The necessary conditions to allow for an additional child require that the disposable bud-
gets are equal to or greater than the estimated needs of an additional child, y˜i,t ≥ τ˜i,t√ui,t
and yˆi,t ≥ τˆi,t√vi,t leading to
√
ui,t ≥ σ˜i,t + (ni,t + 1)τ˜i,t and √vi,t ≥ σˆi,t + (ni,t + 1)τˆi,t.
The policy maker may provide a mix of fixed family policies per child, b˜f and bˆf , and
child benefits proportional to the households resources, b˜vui,t and bˆvvi,t. The parameters
b˜f and b˜v determine financial supports, while bˆf and bˆv represent the additional time
gained by the parents as the result of nonmonetary benefits, such as the provision of
public childcare.10 Any policy mix, b˜f + b˜vui,t, bˆf + bˆvvi,t greater than zero partially
covers the demand of ni,t dependent children,
c˜
(ni,t)
i,t = ni,t
(
τ˜i,t
√
ui,t − b˜f − b˜vui,t
)
cˆ
(ni,t)
i,t = ni,t
(
τˆi,t
√
vi,t − bˆf − bˆvvi,t
)
,
and the disposable budgets can be expressed as
y˜i,t = ui,t − σ˜√ui,t − ni,t
(
τ˜i,t
√
ui,t − b˜f − b˜vui,t
)
yˆi,t = vi,t − σˆ√vi,t − ni,t
(
τˆi,t
√
vi,t − bˆf − bˆvvi,t
)
.
The necessary conditions for having an additional child become
√
ui,t ≥ σ˜i,t + (ni,t + 1)
(
τ˜i,t − b˜
f
√
ui,t
− b˜v√ui,t
)
√
vi,t ≥ σˆi,t + (ni,t + 1)
(
τˆi,t − bˆ
f
√
vi,t
− bˆv√vi,t
)
.
10These functional forms suggest that parents with a higher time budget gain more time from nonmonetary
policies. However, the parameter bˆv may be zero or negative. We include the variable term bˆvvi,t to avoid
unnecessary restrictions.
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These inequalities embrace the direct effect of family policies, i.e. the alleviation of
the resource constraints enabling parents to realise their fertility intentions. Now let us
assume that every household i considers at time t one unit of time equivalent to γi,t
monetary units. This could mean, for example, that working for one unit of time results
in γi,t units of monetary income or spending γi,t monetary units for a babysitter or for
domestic aid results in a gain of one time unit. Then the combined household budget
becomes wi,t = γi,tui,t + vi,t and the individual consumption needs can be expressed as
ci,t = γi,t c˜i,t + cˆi,t
= γi,t σ˜i,t
√
ui,t + σˆi,t
√
vi,t
=
[
γi,t σ˜i,t
√
ui,t
wi,t
+ σˆi,t
√
vi,t
wi,t
]√
wi,t . (11)
This equation explains consumption of a compound resource wi,t as a function of the
square root of the household budget (in terms of the compound resource) times a multi-
plier consisting of two components γi,t σ˜i,t
√
ui,t
wi,t
and σˆi,t
√
vi,t
wi,t
representing the shares
of the demands for time and money, respectively. The parameters σ˜i,t and σˆi,t indicate
the household’s propensity to consume its budget of time and money, respectively. In the
special case σ˜i,t = σ
√
ui,t
wi,t
and σˆi,t = σ
√
vi,t
wi,t
the multiplier in equation (11) can be
expressed as
γi,t σ˜i,t
√
ui,t
wi,t
+ σˆi,t
√
vi,t
wi,t
= γi,t σ
ui,t
wi,t
+ σ
vi,t
wi,t
= σ
γi,tui,t + vi,t
wi,t
= σ
wi,t
wi,t
= σ
and equation (11) becomes ci,t = σ
√
wi,t which is the consumption function with only
one compound resource and a constant propensity to consume presented in Section 2. In
the same way, we may choose τ˜i,t = τ
√
ui,t
wi,t
and τˆi,t = τ
√
vi,t
wi,t
to express the children’s
consumption of the compound resource as
c
ni,t
i,t = γi,t c˜
(ni,t)
i,t + cˆ
(ni,t)
i,t
= γi,t ni,t τ˜i,t
√
ui,t + ni,t τˆi,t
√
vi,t
= γi,t ni,t τ
ui,t√
wi,t
+ ni,t τ
vi,t√
wi,t
= ni,t τ
√
wi,t .
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Finally, if the parameters defining the policy mix to support families fulfil bf = γi,tb˜f + bˆf
and bv = b˜v = bˆv the support can be decomposed as
bf + bvwi,t = b
f + bv(γi,tui,t + vi,t)
= γi,tb˜
f + bˆf + γi,tb˜
vui,t + bˆ
vvi,t
= γi,t(b˜
f + b˜vui,t) + (bˆ
f + bˆvvi,t),
which is the sum of the monetary equivalent of the family support provided in terms of
time units (i.e. institutional childcare) plus the cash benefits.
C The social multiplier
Becker and Murphy (2000) conceptualised the social multiplier that can magnify small
initial changes. In their approach the social environment, goods, and services serve as
arguments in the utilty function in order to analyse how changes in the enviroment affect
choices and behaviour. Changes of social capital raise or lower the level of utility and in-
fluence behaviour if marginal utilities of goods or services change. If a shock affects sev-
eral individuals simultaneously, the cumulative effect of individual choices may be larger
than could be predicted by summing up individual reactions. Although each individual
response has only a small impact on others, social capital mutiplies the effect via the inter-
action of the small individual effects. The social multiplier is defined as the ratio between
the marginal impact of an exogenous change on average behaviour — at the macro level
— to the marginal impact of the same exogenous change on individual behaviour in the
absence of social effects. According to Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (2002) “an
estimated aggregate elasticity incorporates both the true individual level response and ef-
fects stemming from social interactions”. They “define the social multiplier as the ratio
of the group level coefficient to the individual level coefficient, or the amount that the
coefficient rises as” they “move from individual to group level regressions”. While the
formal approach of Becker and Murphy (2000) is based on mathematical functions de-
termining each agent’s reaction to changes in social capital, the empirical approach of
Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (2002) relies on regressions at different levels of
aggregation. Comparisons of aggregate levels with the individual level are assumed to
reflect the impact of social interactions.
To translate these formal and empirical approaches into a simulation environment, we
take advantage of the fact that numerical simulations allow for controlled experiments via
parameter variations. Our modelling framework does not provide a hierarchical structure
of different levels of aggregation, but we can vary the parameters determining the strength
of social influence, pr3 and pr4. In the absence of social effects — that is, pr3 = pr4 = 0
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— individual choices are not affected by others. Hence, the impact at the aggregate level
is simply the sum of pure individual level responses. We estimate the impact of family
policies and simulation parameters on completed cohort fertility over the subsample con-
taining only those simulations with no social effects using a specification similar to (4)
and compute the marginal impacts of one monetary unit11
c˜tfrunitbf = .1309621 + .0115419 ∗ unitbf + .00842 ∗ unitbv
+.0028102 ∗ α+ .0052886 ∗ pr2 + .0000447 ∗ 2 (12)
c˜tfrunitbv = .0455181− .0009613 ∗ unitbv + .00842 ∗ unitbf
+.0001837 ∗ α− .0004116 ∗ pr2 + .0000733 ∗ 2. (13)
This allows us to compute the social multiplier as the ratio of the marginal impact of
family policies on completed cohort fertility for a given level of social influence — given
by equations (7) and (8) — to the marginal impact in absence of any social influence.
Taking (7), (8), (12), and (13) together, the social multipliers for fixed and proportional
family policies can be given as
mf =
ctfrunitbf
c˜tfrunitbf
mv =
ctfrunitbv
c˜tfrunitbv
.
In the case of negative social influence (i.e. pr3 < pr4) the social multipliers are less
than one (because the negative social effects mitigate the effectiveness of family policies)
while they are greater than one for positive social effects (pr3 > pr4). In order to quan-
tify the magnitude of the social multipliers we compute the mean values of the marginal
impacts (equations 7 and 8) for the subsample with positive social effects. For ctfrunitbf
we obtain a mean value of .224 and for ctfrunitbv we get .0808. Considering those sim-
ulations omitting social effects (pr3 = pr4 = 0) the mean value of the marginal impact
c˜tfrunitbf is .202 and the mean value of c˜tfrunitbv is .0604. Dividing the respective
mean values of marginal impacts obtained from these subsamples the social multipliers
become mf = 1.107 and mv = 1.338. This leads us to the conclusion that proportional
family support schemes are more stronlgy reinforced by social effects than fixed family
supports. This corresponds with the finding that proportional family policies contribute
more to the indirect effect than fixed policies (see Section 3.).
11Because pr3 = pr4 = 0 we skip those covariates containing pr3 or pr4.
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D Animation 
 
The animation linked to figure A-1 illustrates the life course of three agents born in the 
simulation years 47, 48, and 50 who are connected via social ties. Agent 1 reaches 
adulthood at age 21 with an initial intended fertility of 1 at time 68, agent 3 reaches 
adulthood at age 19 with intended fertility 2 at time 69, and agent 2 reaches adulthood 
at age 28 with intended fertility 0 at time 76. For agents 1 and 2 the budget constraint 
(3) is not active, which means they could afford a child under the given level of public 
family support. This is indicated by a green line following the transition to adulthood. 
For agent 3 the budget constraint (3) is active. Therefore, she cannot afford to fulfil her 
wish to have children. This is indicated by a red line following the transition to 
adulthood. Agent 1 gives birth to her first child at age 30 at time 77. Because of this 
experience, agent 2 increases her intended fertility to 1 at age 30 at time 78. In the 
sequel, she actually gives birth at age 35 at time 83. Finally, agent 3 dies at age 78 at 
time 128, agent 2 dies at age 94 at time 142, and agent 1 dies at age 97 at time 144. 
 
Figure A-1: The life course of three agents who are connected via social ties 
 
Click here for animated Lexis diagram 
 
 
